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Consumer Tactics as 'Weapons' 
 
Black lists, union labels, and the American Federation of Labor 
 
Wendy A. Wiedenhoft 
John Carroll University, USA 
 
Abstract.  This article examines the role consumer tactics played in the 
American Federation of Labor’s (AFL) strategy of business unionism. In 
particular, it explains how the AFL used its consumer tactics to try to mobilize 
the purchasing power of union members and their families to fight for higher 
wages and shorter working hours. The historical data collected for this article 
demonstrates that the AFL was not ignorant of the relationship between 
production and consumption, or the worker and the consumer. I discuss how 
the AFL used its consumer tactics to try to build solidarity across its affiliated 
trade unions and provide a way for the wives, daughters, and mothers of 
union men to become involved in the labor movement through consumption. 
I argue that these consumer tactics need to be fully acknowledged,  as they 
were pivotal in some of the most contentious struggles between the AFL and 
business at the turn of the 20th century. 
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THE AMERICAN   FEDERATION OF LABOR’S  (AFL) strategy of  
business unionism has been singled out as a distinguishing factor 
in the history of organized labor in the United States. Compared to 
trade unions in Britain, Germany, and France, organized labor in 
the United States turned away from achieving its goals, such as 
higher wages and shorter working days, through political action in 
the arena of the state (Hattam, 1993; Dubofsky, 1994; Mink, 1986; 
Robertson, 2000). Constrained by the power of  the state, 
particularly the judiciary,  as well as the power of employers, the AFL 
adopted the position that ‘economic power [was] the basis upon 
which may be developed power in other fields’ (Gompers, 1925: 286–
7). While the AFL did support protective labor legislation for females 
and children and legislation to restrict Chinese immigration, it did 
not consider legislation a legitimate route for elevating the 
economic power of skilled, craft workers. This was particularly the 
case during the formative years of the AFL, when the organization 
was under the leadership of Samuel Gompers. Gomper’s advocacy 
of ‘pure and simple’ business unionism located the struggle of 
organized labor on the shop floor, decisively away from the 
interference of the state. 
  
 
Although much  has been  written  regarding the  various 
tactics of business unionism, including collective bargaining and 
strikes, the consumer tactics that the AFL created in promoting 
business unionism have been neglected (exceptions include 
Frank, 1994; Glickman, 1997). While the boycott is mentioned 
generally  as a tactic of business unionism, an elaboration of 
precisely how it fitted into the AFL’s overall strategy  is omitted. This 
is particularly surprising considering  the amount of attention that the 
AFL devoted to promoting its two consumer boycott tactics, the ‘We 
Don’t Patronize’ list and the union label, from the late 19th to early 
20th centuries (Laidler, 1913; Spedden, 1910; Wolman, 1916). 
The  neglect of  these consumer tactics is also interesting 
considering that the AFL encountered two of its most problematic 
conflicts with business and the judiciary regarding  the  publication 
of  its ‘We  Don’t  Patronize’ list. Glickman (1997) provides an 
excellent account of how organized labor constructed a working-
class consciousness through  the  union  label, particularly how 
consumers were viewed as ‘employers’ when making purchasing 
decisions and how the union label campaign brought women 
consumers directly into the labor movement. However, Glickman 
does not discuss in detail exactly how  the  union  label fitted into  
the AFL’s  overall strategy of  business unionism, especially how the 
union label was implemented by the organization, nor does he 
address the consumer tactic of the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. By 
studying the union label and the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list in tandem, 
one can understand the important differences between the two 
consumer tactics, especially how the latter contributed to the 
animosity among the AFL, small businesses, and the judiciary. 
 
There is little doubt that the strike was the primary labor 
weapon of the AFL during this time period; however, boycotts were 
used to support strikes and some members of the AFL suggested 
that boycotts were ‘safer’ than strikes because workers could fight 
for their demands without losing their paychecks. In this article I 
explore the AFL’s understanding of the economic power of 
consumers and explain how the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list and the 
union label fit into the ‘pure and simple’ ideology of the AFL. I 
discuss why the AFL advocated consumer tactics in its struggle to 
improve workplace issues, such as higher wages and shorter 
working hours, as well as  how it tried to mobilize its members  
through these tactics. Finally, I demonstrate how business and the 
state responded to the AFL’s consumer tactics, including one of the 





THE ECONOMIC  POWER OF THE CONSUMER 
The ‘consumerist turn’ (Glickman, 1997) of the labor 
movement during the Progressive era is hardly surprising 
considering that Americans of this time period witnessed the rise 
of mass consumption, from the introduction of cheap, 
standardized goods to the creation of the modern department 
store (Benson, 1986; Fox and Lears, 1983; Glickman, 1999; 
Leach, 1993; McGovern, 1993; Strasser,  1989; Trachtenberg, 
1980). Even  the current marketing practice of targeting specific 
consumer groups was established during this time when, Charles 
McGovern (1993: 14) argues, advertisers changed their practices 
from a ‘loosely placed “general publicity” on behalf of products’, to 
the practice ‘of identifying markets for specific goods and creating 
demand for them through means of public communications’. 
Interestingly, not only did many of the means of consumption that 
are now commonplace emerge during the Progressive era; so did 
several of  the theories of consumption that are debated today, 
most notably Thorstein Veblen’s  theory  of  conspicuous 
consumption (Horowitz, 1985). While Veblen overwhelmingly 
viewed consumption as  a social problem  that encouraged 
wasting money and time, other social economists of the time, 
including George Gunton and Simon Patten, theorized that 
consumption had the potential to promote the general welfare and 
wealth of society by enhancing the moral character and living 
standards of the working class. 
 
This positive understanding of  consumption as  a means for 
social change, particularly the economic power of the consumer to 
use his or her purchasing power as a way to change unfair work 
conditions or sway public policy, shaped consumer consciousness 
during the Progressive era.1 ‘It was during the Progressive era,’ states 
Hofstadter, ‘that the urban consumer first stepped forward as a 
serious and self-conscious factor in American social politics’ (1955: 
171). Cohen (2003) refers to this time period as the ‘first-wave 
consumer movement’, and though  her work primarily deals with 
consumption from the Depression to the 1960s, the origins of 
what she calls the ‘citizen consumer’ were clearly established during 
the Progressive era. Citizen consumers, or consumers who ‘take 
on the political responsibility we usually associate with citizens to 
consider the general good of the nation through their consumption’ 
(Cohen, 2001: 204), aptly characterize middle-  and  upper-class 
  
Progressive reform organizations, such as the National 
Consumers’ League (NCL). While the NCL did employ consumer 
tactics quite similar to the AFL, including a ‘white list’ and ‘white 
label’, it eventually moved away from trying to mobilize the 
economic power of consumers in the marketplace to mobilizing 
the political power of consumers in the arena of the state (Sklar, 
1998; Storrs, 2000). 
 
The AFL embraced the Progressive understanding of the 
economic power of the consumer and constructed a unique 
working-class consumer consciousness around it. Although there is 
little doubt that trade unionists of the AFL identified themselves  as 
workers first and consumers second, there was a concerted effort 
during the Progressive era to get workers to realize that their 
actions as consumers directly effected their employment 
conditions. 
According to Gompers: 
 
the organized wage-worker moves by two cardinal, moral 
principles. The first is his right, if he is a free man, to 
dispose of his labor power as he wills. The second is his 
right, if he is not a slave, to dispose of his purchasing 
power as he chooses. (1920: 
215) 
 
Union workers and their families could use their economic power 
as consumers  to fight for shorter working hours  and higher wages 
through their wallets and pocketbooks. The interests of organized 
labor were always at the forefront of  the AFL’s  understanding of  
the economic power of consumption in contrast to the interests 
of  consumers. The  consumer’s search for the greatest quantity of 
goods at the lowest prices was antithetical to the AFL’s agenda. 
Cheap goods were often produced by the unskilled labor of  
children, women, and immigrants in sweatshops,  which drove 
down the wages of  organized male workers. In the words of  
one AFL member, ‘the principle that a dollar expended in the 
maintenance of fair labor is worth more in the end than a dollar 
saved at the bargain counter’ (Macarthur, 1904: 575). 
 
The AFL recognized that the power of union consumers was 
linked to its struggles for fair wages and an 8-hour workday. The AFL 
reasoned that a worker’s  income should depend upon his 
expenditures – an inversion of the ‘hollow’  classical ‘iron law of 
wages’. One article in the American Federationist made this relationship 
between consumption and wages explicit: 
  
 
What determines more potentially the consuming power 
of the workers than the wages they receive in return for 
labor performed? . . . The old theory that the selling price 
of an article shall determine the wages paid to the 
workman is hollow, shallow and unnatural. The order must 
be reversed and the first consideration in the selling price 
of an article must be a fair wage to labor. Wages must 
dominate prices, not prices dominate wages. (Gompers, 
1904: 41) 
 
     The AFL argued that manufacturers were neglecting to bring 
consumption into the equation of production. On  more than one 
occasion, Gompers expressed the folly of businesses that increased 
the prices of their products without increasing the wages of their 
workers. This was not a solution to low profits because it hindered 
the consuming power of the workers, resulting  in  glutted markets 
and  eventually ‘industrial stagnation’. Gompers captured the 
irrationality of such practices in the annual AFL convention report 
of 1893: 
 
Production, production, production, faster, greater, was the 
impulse, the thought and motive of the capitalist class. 
That in the end the great body of workers comprise those 
who must of necessity consume the production was given 
no consideration whatever by our ‘Captains of Industry.’ As 
a result, the great storehouses are glutted with the very 
articles required by the people, without their ability – or 
rather their opportunity – to consume them. (Gompers, 
1920: 85) 
 
The business focus on production at the expense of consumption 
would never, according to the AFL, expand the material wealth of 
the nation. In effect, it  was  retrogressive and blocked the  
progress of  civilization by stultifying the American standard of 
living. After all, ‘if  cheap labor meant progress, advancement, and 
civilization, then China would today be at the head of  the nations 
of  the world,’ claimed Gompers. An American workman could not 
‘be expected to eat dogs and rats and live on rice . . . he wants a 
better room and a better house’ (American  Federationist, 1902: 
709). Of  course, to enjoy an American standard of living union 
workers needed higher wages. 
 
According to the AFL, a living wage was determined by one’s 
standard of living, or the capacity of a worker to consume at the 
social level of his peers. Thus, a living wage was  not  equivalent 
  
to  the  concept  of  the minimum wage as understood by the 
state. The AFL was critical of the budget studies conducted by 
government agencies, particularly the various state bureaus of labor 
statistics, because they did not take into account the standard of 
living. Instead, most of these studies focused on the minimum 
amount of income a worker needed to earn in order to support his 
family at a nominal level of existence. For example, in 1894 the AFL 
criticized a budget study by the Iowa Commission of Labor Statistics, 
which concluded that a worker only needed to earn $12 per week, 
or $624 per year, in order to support his family. After taking into 
account the cost of basic necessities, which amounted to $567.84 
annually, this left the family only $56.16 for other types of 
expenditures to provide a comfortable standard of living. In a reply 
to this study, one AFL member argued: 
 
Is there any workingman amongst us who does not want 
to see his family  comfortable at least? Who would not like to 
have carpets on the floors, curtains on the windows, or 
pictures on the wall? No home should be without these, 
or some of them, at least. Yet in the foregoing statistics 
not one dollar has been allowed for anything of the sort. 
(Weimer, 1894: 218–19) 
 
The connection between wages and the standard of living was not 
unique to the AFL’s philosophy.  Social economists  of the time also 
acknowledged that the ‘desire for a higher standard of living 
decides the minimum pay demanded by trade unions and 
operates to increase earnings’ (Streightoff, 1910: 11). George 
Gunton (1897) argued that employers who tried to reap higher 
profits by keeping wages low and raising the prices of their goods 
would suffer a loss in sales. Gunton proposed in a pamphlet that he 
wrote for the AFL that ‘the standard of living is the economic law  of 
wages’ (Gunton, 1899: 11, emphasis in  original). Like his mentor, 
Ira Steward, Gunton believed that workers ‘would improve their 
condition not by saving but by spending’ (Horowitz, 1985: 42). The 
AFL did not expect that workers could immediately attain the 
standard of living of middle- or upper-class families, but it did believe 
that workers could cultivate their tastes and increase their wants if 
they worked fewer hours. Thus, leisure was a key variable in raising a 
worker’s standard of living, which in turn would increase his wages. 
 
The AFL’s fight for a living wage was intricately linked to its fight 
for an eight-hour workday. Ira Steward was one of the first labor 
advocates to propose that the solution to low wages was a shorter 
workday. In his essay ‘A Reduction of Hours, an Increase in Wages’, 
  
published in 1865, Steward argued that ‘more leisure will create 
motives and temptations for the most ordinary laborer to insist upon 
higher wages’ (Glickman, 1997: 102–3). The advancement of labor 
in America rested upon its ability to consume, and the  purchasing 
power  of  labor depended  upon  more  leisure. Gunton 
suggested that leisure was the basis of expanding the social 
opportunities of the working class because it would allow the worker 
to enlarge his ‘field of experience by making more frequent and 
varied social intercourse’. This increased exposure to ‘new and 
more complex social relations’, claimed Gunton, would ‘awaken 
and develop new tastes and desires for more social comforts’. 
Observing how the middle and upper classes live, the working class 
‘would naturally begin to desire more wholesome and better 
appointed homes, more literature, [and] entertainment’ (Gunton, 
1899: 12–14). Gompers  seemed to  fully support the beliefs of  
Steward and Gunton, claiming that: 
 
increased leisure brings forth a desire, a taste, a demand 
for a book, a paper, a magazine, either of which creates a 
further demand . . . leisure forces the worker’s attention to 
the clothing of his wife and children, it compels the worker 
to be in the streets at the time when people are best 
dressed, he and his must be clad near an approach to the 
average or be regarded as social inferiors. (1897: 24) 
 
It was evident to the AFL that the state was going to secure neither 
shorter working days for male workers  nor  a living wage. 
Therefore, the AFL struggled for these labor rights on the shop 
floor using the tactic of the strike and at the store counter using 
the tactic of the boycott. 
 
LISTS AND  LABELS: BOYCOTTS AND  BUSINESS UNIONISM 
 
The  boycott occupies not simply an important site of  the 
struggle for organized labor in the USA; it also provides a provocative 
point from which to study the relationship between production and 
consumption, workers and consumers. The AFL understood this 
relationship, recognizing that workers could use their purchasing 
power as consumers to help improve their  working conditions on  
the  shop floor. In  other  words, the AFL constructed that act of 
consumption as more than, in the words of Adam Smith, ‘the end 
of production’, but as a means to change production (Smith, 1937). 
Workers could use consumption as a means to change production 
by either withholding their purchasing power from firms that 
discriminated against organized labor or directing their purchasing 
  
power toward firms that met  the  demands of  organized labor. 
The  AFL devised tactics to capture both of these forms of 
consumption: the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list to withhold union 
patronage and the union label to encourage the purchasing of 
union-made products. 
 
The ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list was first published in 1894 in the 
AFL’s monthly journal, the American Federationist (AF). The list was a 
register of manufacturers who refused to implement AFL wage and 
hours standards and openly discriminated against union  labor. 
Union  workers were striking at many of the firms that were on 
the list, which turned the list into an economic weapon to 
strengthen the power of the strike (Burnett, 1891:  172; Wolman,  
1916:  22). Retail  establishments and  firms that conducted 
business with manufacturers  unfair to union labor were also 
placed on the list. This practice turned the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list 
into a ‘secondary’ boycott, intended to ‘induce or persuade third 
parties to cease business relations with those against whom there 
is a grievance’ (Laidler, 1913: 64). 
 
The ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list was considered a ‘positive’ boycott 
as it was meant to prohibit workers from purchasing goods from 
the firms on it, similar to the black lists used by employers to 
discriminate against union workers (Laidler, 1913: 60). Although it 
was classified as a positive boycott, the list carried the negative 
connotations of the employers’ black lists. The refusal to buy 
products manufactured by firms unfair to union labor was viewed 
just as destructive  as the refusal of employers to hire union workers. 
Indeed, the practice of boycotting during the Gilded Age and 
Progressive era was generally viewed as a tool of coercion or 
intimidation by ‘combinations’ or trusts, whether they be initiated by 
organized labor or employers (Burnett, 1891: 164; Laidler, 1913: 
17; Wolman, 1916: 11). The AFL attempted to minimize the 
adverse associations identified with the boycott by taking strict 
precautions that no firm was  placed on the ‘We  Don’t Patronize’ 
list unfairly. Speaking at the 1897 annual convention, Gompers 
stated that ‘in no case has a concern been placed upon the “We  
Don’t Patronize” list until it has had the opportunity to be heard 
in its own defense’ (Gompers, 1920). However, so many firms were 
being placed on the list every month that the AFL decided at its 
convention in 1900 to drop all firms from the list, claiming that the 
sheer number of firms was bringing the list ‘into a state of 
impotency’ (American Federationist, 1901: 166). 
 
  
The AFL did not discontinue its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list and 
allowed its affiliated trade unions to  request renewals of  firms 
that they were boycotting. This was primarily an attempt by the 
AFL to coordinate, thus exert more control over, local boycotts. It 
was also a way to legitimize the list as a more judicious tactic. The 
AFL began to require its affiliates to first try  to  settle its disputes 
with  firms privately, and more  amicably. For example, the AFL 
stated that ‘in our judgement questions of this character can and 
should be more justly discussed through correspondence than to 
air such matters through the press, even though they be our official 
publications’ (Lorwin, 1933: 48). Before a requested firm was placed 
on the ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list, the AFL required that trade unions 
provide the Executive Council with a full statement of its 
grievances against the firm and explain what efforts had been made 
to resolve these grievances. The Executive Council then decided if 
the trade union had acted in good faith and made ‘every effort to 
amicably adjust the matter’ with the firm in question. If this was 
found to be the case, the Executive Council approved the firm to 
be placed on the list (American  Federationist, 1904: 161). Trade 
unions with firms on the list were required to report on the efforts 
being made to resolve the grievances that had led to the boycott 
every three months; failure to do so resulted in the firm being 
dropped from the list (American Federationist, 1907a: 352). Along with 
these stricter criteria, the AFL decided to limit the number of firms 
that individual trade unions could place on the list at any given 
time. International unions were limited to three listings and local 
unions to only one. Not  surprisingly, these stricter regulations 
decreased the number of boycotts approved by the AFL every year. 
While 81 boycotts were endorsed between 1902–3, only 21 were 
approved from 1905–6. However, the number of firms on the list 
did increase after 1906 at the height of the AFL’s struggle with 
business and the state over the legality of this tactic (Laidler, 1913: 
112–13). 
 
The union label escaped many of the negative connotations 
associated  with  the  ‘We  Don’t  Patronize’ list because it  was  
considered a ‘negative’ or ‘indirect’ boycott  (Laidler, 1913: 60; 
Wolman, 1916: 14). Rather than asking workers  to withhold their 
patronage from firms, it is recommended that they buy products 
made with union labor. While the ‘We  Don’t Patronize’ list was 
viewed as destructive, the union label was considered constructive. 
As one commentator wrote in the North American Review, ‘the label 
builds up the fair  employer’s  trade instead of  tearing down the 
unfair man’s  business,  as did the boycott. The  union  label is 
  
constructive, not destructive’ (Kelly, 1897: 36). A leaflet published by 
the Social Reform  Club of  New York praised the union label as  
a tool of progress, claiming that ‘the label has resulted from that 
steady constructive effort toward improvement which is carried on 
by wage earners’ and that ‘it has great interest for everyone who 
loves fair play, self-help, and equal chances for all’ (Brooks,  1898: 
207).2 
 
Interestingly, the origins of the union label were not quite so 
constructive. The first label was issued in 1875 by the Cigar Makers’ 
Association of the Pacific Coast in an attempt to protect skilled craft 
jobs from unskilled Chinese competition. Threatened by the low 
wages and low standard of living acceptable to  Chinese workers, 
the Association used racist, anti- immigration sentiments to appeal 
to white cigar consumers. This first label, which was  white in color, 
was  pasted upon cigar boxes that contained union-made cigars. It 
stated that ‘the cigars contained in this box are made by WHITE 
MEN’ and it was only issued to manufacturers who employed white 
cigar makers. The Association continued to use this white union label 
until it was replaced by the Cigar Makers’ International Union 
(CMIU) label in 1884. Anti-immigration sentiments continued to be 
used to appeal to white consumers  with the CMIU  label, 
although the connection to immigrant labor was more directly 
connected to the quality of workman- ship and cleanliness of 
working conditions. The CMIU  label stated that cigars ‘had been 
made by a first class workman, a member of the Cigar Makers’  
International Union  of  America, an  organization opposed to 
inferior rat shop, coolie, prison, or filthy tenement-house 
workmanship’ (Spedden, 1910: 10–15). While the issue of an 
American standard of living for union workers was certainly 
represented in this label – CMUI members would not find it 
acceptable to live in ‘filthy’ tenement houses – the focus on quality 
and cleanliness of cigars signaled a recognition that the interests of 
consumers were also important. If union demands or anti-
immigration sentiments would  not  appeal to  consumers, 
perhaps the  safety of  the products they consumed would. 
According to Spedden, from 1880 to 1890 the union label was used 
‘not as a means of appeal to unionists to support other unionists, 
but as a means of appeal to the public against conditions that 
were generally discountenanced – tenement-houses, sweat-shop, 
and prison labor’ (Spedden, 1910: 17). 
 
Maintaining its position on trade union autonomy, the AFL 
allowed each of its affiliates to design its own unique union label. 
  
Thus, union labels differed in shape, size, color, and even texture; 
some union  labels were stamped, others engraved or sewn onto 
products. In 1895 the AFL prepared a bill for a uniform label and 
also resolved to investigate the matter of creating a universal label 
at its 1899 convention, but the Executive Council decided against 
enforcing a universal label on its affiliates. Therefore, at any given 
time there existed a large variety of union labels being used 
across the country, resulting both in difficulty of obtaining 
trademarks to protect each label and counterfeiting. The AFL was 
successful at obtaining trade- marks for many union labels at the 
state level, which meant that trade unions could sue 
manufacturers and merchants who used or sold counterfeit labels. 
This success of  procuring  trademarks for union  labels was 
significant because it forced states to recognize trade unions as legal 
entities. According to Willard,‘in granting protection to union labels 
of associations of workingmen, the different states have recognized 
their right of property. . . and in doing so have legalized the status of 
such associations or combinations’ (Willard, 1895: 157–8). 
Surprisingly, this was one judiciary issue where  the AFL did not  
face  immediate hostility. In  fact, trade unions encountered an 
easier time in court than manufacturers  did in terms of protecting 
trademarks. While ‘manufacturers had a long fight before they 
could induce the courts to recognize their right to a trademark’ the 
‘very first attempt on the part of the workmen to get that protection 
was granted’ (Cohen, 1900: 377). 
 
By the mid-1890s, the AFL started to employ the union label as a 
means to organize non-union workers and to direct union-earned 
dollars toward union-labeled products. The AFL touted the union 
label as the ‘one practical means of  universal self-protection [on] 
which workers  can unite’ (American Federationist, 1895: 9). Gompers 
claimed at the 1899 convention that: 
 
the union label has not only been the means of organizing 
large numbers of non-unionists, but better than all, it has 
stimulated and strengthened unity and fraternity among 
the organized workers of the different trades and callings. 
(Gompers, 1920: 177) 
 
While consumers  sympathetic to the union cause, like members  
of  the NCL, were welcome to purchase union-labeled goods (see 
Gompers 1896: 144), the AFL simply did not have the resources to 
recruit actively middle- and upper-class consumers. The AFL 
reasoned that these consumers were not driven by the ‘desire for 
cheapness’ because they understood that cheap goods were often 
  
produced by child labor, exploited female workers or in unclean 
sweatshops (Hall, 1905: 71–2). Even Brooks recognized that 
reform-minded consumers would not be likely to purchase the 
working- class goods that  displayed the  union  label (Brooks, 
1898, 1899). John Morrison, a consultant for the AFL’s Union Label 
Committee contacted in 1908 on how to advertise the label better, 
expressed this point. Morrison claimed that ‘no matter how much 
you advertise to appeal to the general public, who are not in any 
way connected with the labor movement, they will not ask for the 
label’ (1908: 630). Thus, the AFL did not need to waste its time and 
energy enlisting their purchasing power to support union- labeled 
goods. Instead, it could concentrate on mobilizing its current and 
potential members. ‘It is to this desire,’ according to John Mitchell, 
President of the United Mine Workers of America, ‘to enlist the 
workingman as a consumer in support for his demand as a 
producer that we owe the union label’ (Mitchell, 1903: 293). 
 
While the AFL used the union label to identify its members as 
both workers and consumers, it also used this tactic to mobilize the 
purchasing power of the wives, daughters,  sisters, and mothers  of 
union workers. It became increasingly  evident that the strength of  
the union label rested upon  the  cooperation  of  these women,  
who  spent ‘union  dollars’  to maintain working-class households. 
The AFL passed a resolution at its 1896 convention, stating that it 
was its members’ ‘duty to see that their wives and families  patronized 
union  products’. The  Woman  Union  Label League (WULL) was 
established in 1899 as an educational organization to inform union 
wives and families on what kinds of products were made by the 
different trade unions. It also instructed them on what various union 
labels looked like and where they were located on  different 
types of  goods. WULL was promoted as a means to get union 
wives to understand that shopping was a collective, rather than 
individual, practice as these women could ‘ill afford to consider 
individual economy or individual convenience when spending the 
money earned by union men’ (Williamson, 1906: 171). Through 
participating in WULL, union wives could finally ‘feel a corporate 
interest in the labor movement as a whole’ and ‘become conscious 
of their power as women and their influence as members of an 
organization’. According to Mamie Brettell, President and General 
Organizer of WULL, it was critical that union wives become 
‘enlisted in the settlement of the burning questions of  our times, 
with which men have been struggling against fearful odds, too 
often without sympathy in the home’ (Brettell, 1905: 276). The 
AFL viewed the high morals of womankind as a powerful force to 
  
mobilize in its struggle for social justice, particularly  as a way to 
promote the constructive attributes of the union label. According 
to one union member, the union label was ‘peculiarly adapted to the 
nature of that factor  which  typifies the  highest morality and 
controls the  purchasing power  of  every  community,  to  wit,  the  
mistress of  the  household’ (Macarthur, 1904: 575). Enlisting 
women as union-spenders  could reveal the humanity of  the labor 
movement, even though it did, as  Glickman (1997: 109) correctly 
points out, place a large burden on working-class women to 
manage the household budget efficiently and to conscientiously buy 
union labeled goods. 
 
The AFL advocated its union label to union members and their 
families as a potential substitute for the strike. The numerous 
injunctions that the AFL encountered made the strike a costly tactic 
both in terms of securing money for workers on strike and legal 
fees for fighting these injunctions in court. The low job security 
associated with the strike made it a sacrifice that many AFL members 
did not eagerly embrace. The union label was viewed as a powerful 
weapon that trade unionists could use to fight employers in the 
economic realm, while keeping their jobs and avoiding court 
injunctions. One AFL member claimed that ‘the union label is 
powerful because it accomplishes by peaceful means, with 
absolute certainty and little cost, that which the strike and boycott 
seek to accomplish, always at great cost and sacrifice and often 
without apparent results’ (Macarthur, 1904: 573). This view of the 
union label was shared by another AFL member, who argued that: 
 
the battles of the label are won without blood. It is more 
powerful than strikes and picketing; and its potency as a 
warning to tyrannical employers surpasses a union treasury 
congested with surplus funds . . . No injunctions can reach 
it, no militia of Pinkertons dare touch it, no pen will revile it, 
no pulpit assail it. (Shevlin, 1904: 577) 
 
Local trade unionists of  the Denver Union  Label League (DULL) 
also viewed the union label as safer and more economical than 
strikes. ‘While the striker’s place may be filled,’ argued one DULL 
member, ‘there is no substitute for the label’ (Denver Union Label 
League, 1906). 
 
BUSINESSES ORGANIZE TO FIGHT CONSUMER TACTICS 
 
The tactics that the AFL employed to mobilize consumers did 
not go unnoticed by business or the state. Indeed, contentious 
  
relationships developed between these actors over the ways in 
which the AFL employed its consumer tactics. Although these 
relationships did not turn into violent conflicts, they did involve 
power struggles over the control of production and consumption. 
Manufacturers attacked the AFL on the publication of its ‘We Don’t 
Patronize’ list, claiming that this tactic was coercive and interfered 
with their individual rights to produce and sell goods. They 
organized their own associations to try to combat this boycott tactic. 
The battles between business and the AFL would be resolved, not 
in the marketplace, but in the arena of the judiciary. For the AFL, 
the unfortunate result of this struggle was that its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ 
list was declared unconstitutional. The AFL was forced to give up 
this consumer tactic and as a result made the decision to 
concentrate its consumer mobilizing efforts on its remaining tactic, 
the union label. 
 
Business responded to  the AFL’s  boycott tactics by 
organizing into associations (see Forbath, 1999). One of the first 
examples of this occurred in 1886 when the Brewers’ Association 
agreed that if one of its members was subjected to a labor boycott, 
they would all cease selling their products. This would leave 
consumers without any substitute for beer on the market, which 
they hoped would force consumers  to stand up against any beer 
boycott and shape consumer opinion against organized labor 
(Wolman, 1916: 39). The National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) was organized in 1895 to promote free trade, but as 
Gompers stated, ‘starting in 1902 [it] began its campaign to deprive 
organized labor of its primary rights – the right to work or withhold 
their labor power . . . and the right to buy from whom they choose’ 
(Gompers, 1920: 50). Another business organization, the American 
Anti-Boycott Association (AABA), was formed in 1902 as a direct result 
of the AFL success at mobilizing union purchasing power through 
its ‘We  Don’t Patronize’ list. NAM and the AABA controlled 
significant resources, not just in terms of money, but in terms of 
power through political alliances. Members of both organizations 
used these resources to take the AFL to court over boycotts that 
were destroying their businesses. 
 
Stereotypes invoked to describe manufacturers during the 
Progressive era are often ‘big business’, ‘monopolies’,  or ‘trusts’, 
but small and mid- sized firms also existed, struggling to survive 
in the marketplace. These ‘proprietary capitalists’ (Ernst, 1989) 
were untouched by the managerial revolution and were victims 
of  big business, organized labor, and state regulations. Big 
  
business could afford to obey government regulations and 
possessed the capital to either fight with, or concede to, the 
demands of organized labor. Small and mid-sized firms lacked 
the  finances to  do either, and the competition from big business 
often drove them into bankruptcy. These  proprietary capitalists 
best characterized the  majority of AABA members. Most, if not all 
AABA members, were particularly hostile to the AFL; they refused 
to unionize their shops because it meant they would be forced to 
surrender their ‘right of managerial authority’ to their employees 
(Ernst, 1989:  138). This  refusal to  recognize the  right  of 
workers to unionize made the businesses of AABA members 
particularly vulnerable to attacks from the AFL, who fought the 
AABA through its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. 
 
Interestingly, both the AABA and the AFL used a similar 
discourse of ‘freedom’ and ‘individual rights’ to support their respective 
positions on the boycott issue. According to the platform of the 
AABA: 
 
The boycott must be regarded as that un-American and 
reprehensible practice of organized labor whereby the 
products of a given manufacturer or any individual are 
held up to denunciation, contempt, and proscription 
under a spirit of blackmail . . . Such a practice is foreign to 
principles of fair dealing and equity which we love to 
regard as the spirit of our nation. (Wolman, 1916: 40) 
 
While the AABA promoted the individual rights of employers to 
conduct business freely, without  interference from labor, the AFL 
paralleled this ideology through promoting the individual rights of 
employees to spend their money freely. Gompers  declared in his 
1893 testimony before the Industrial Commission that: 
 
men have a right to do business, but this is one-half of the 
truth. The men with whom business  is done have the right 
to withdraw and transfer their custom. This is the other half, 
which is always ignored in anti-boycott arguments . . . 
workmen have a right to say that they will not patronize 
those who are unfriendly to them and those who support 
their adversaries. (Gompers, 1920: 209) 
 
The AFL challenged the AABA’s position that boycotting was a 
‘foreign’ practice, or ‘un-American’. Gompers  claimed that the 
boycott was  the quintessential American tactic to  fight for 
freedom, and compared the AFL’s  use  of  the  boycott  to  the  
colonial nonimportation  movement during the American 
  
Revolution of boycotting British products. Gompers argued that ‘all 
students of American history know that the Boston “tea party” 
was  an American boycott against British merchants and British 
government’ (Gompers, 1907c: 875–80). He  also suggested that 
citizens refer to a recent book by Woodrow Wilson called History  of 
the American People  that  discussed the  patriotic impulse of  the  
nonimportation movement, and then ‘let each ask himself whether 
labor’s boycott of to- day is unpatriotic, un-American.’ 
 
As much as the AABA asserted its members’ rights to freely 
conduct trade and control the workforce, it eventually had to seek 
recourse against AFL boycotts in the state arena. Considering the 
AABA’s ideology, the turn to state intervention was  uncharacteristic 
of  small business at the time. While many monopoly enterprises 
supported state regulations because they could afford to implement 
safety standards and economically benefited from the state  incurring  
the  responsibility of  protecting  consumers, small businesses with 
local markets suffered. Federally mandated trade regulations did not 
apply to intra-state commerce, only to interstate trade. Thus, only 
small and mid-sized firms that were able to build a nationwide 
market for their products could use federal trade regulations to their 
advantage. Interstate commerce laws were particularly significant 
when  one AABA member, Dietrich Loewe, commenced an 
attack against the AFL’s ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. This was because 
the list was disseminated nationally and, therefore, constituted a 
nationwide boycott. 
 
Loewe, a co-founder  of  the AABA and owner  of  a hat 
factory in Danbury, CT, prepared a case that tested the legality of 
the AFL’s ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list after the United Hatters of America 
(UHA), an AFL affiliate, decided to issue a boycott against his 
products. The boycott was a result of Loewe’s refusal to unionize his 
factories, or operate a ‘closed shop’. Wages were also an issue as 
the UHA claimed that workers earned almost twice as much in 
closed shops ($22–$24 per week for an 8-hour day) compared to 
$13 per day for 12–15-hour days in open, or non-union shops. The 
UHA presented the reasons for its boycott to the Executive Council 
of the AFL, which approved the boycott and published Loewe’s firm 
on its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. While this action would have probably 
been enough to incite Loewe, the fact that the AFL also asked 
retailers to participate in this boycott constituted nothing less than 
‘blackmail’ to the AABA. Involving retailers meant that the AFL was 
not only conducting a primary boycott in which its own members  
were requested to withhold their patronage, but also a secondary 
  
boycott in which individuals outside of the labor movement were 
asked, or in some cases prevented, from purchasing Loewe’s 
products. The secondary boycott against Loewe was indeed 
coercive. A shipping clerk at Loewe’s factory was employed by the 
AFL to report the locations of where Loewe’s goods were being 
shipped and to what retailers. The AFL used this information to 
persuade personally these retailers not to conduct business with 
Loewe (Laidler, 1913: 152; Robertson, 2000: 112). 
 
The AFL’s ability to mobilize the purchasing power of its members 
was successful and the boycott on Loewe proved quite effective. 
Before the boycott  was  issued in  1901, Loewe’s  net  profits were  
reported  to  be $27,000; his profits decreased to $17,000 only one 
year after the boycott, and fell to $15,000  as the boycott continued 
into 1903. When Loewe finally filed a lawsuit against the UHA on 31 
August 1903, he claimed his company had suffered a net loss of 
$88,000 due to the boycott (Laidler, 1913: 152–3). Loewe argued in 
his lawsuit that the UHA boycott violated the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act of 1890, which deemed business practices that interfered with 
interstate trade illegal. The Sherman Act was initially passed to 
protect consumers  from price-fixing and other coercive practices 
of  monopoly industries. In fact, under the Sherman Act, business 
combinations or trusts were considered illegal associations. 
According to Senator John Sherman: 
 
the object of this bill . . . is to declare unlawful trusts and 
combinations in restraint of trade and production . . . This 
bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and 
labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but 
only to prevent and control combinations made with a 
view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, 
or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of 
the consumer. (Kolko, 
1963: 61–2) 
 
The Sherman Act was rarely applied in practice towards 
business. In fact, it ‘posed an incomparably greater threat to labor 
than capital’ because the federal government had to bring suits 
against capital in order to enforce the Sherman Act, but capital or 
business could bring suits against labor ‘without any government 
action at all’ (Sklar, 1988: 224–5). While many people understood 
the AFL as a labor monopoly or trust, it was not until Loewe filed 
his lawsuit that the state began to consider the AFL a combination. 
According to Gompers, this was a ridiculous stretch of the 
  
imagination because a trust, by definition, had to monopolize 
and control the production and distribution of a material product. 
Labor was not a material commodity, therefore the AFL should not 
have been considered a trust because ‘there can not be a trust in 
something which is not yet produced’ (Gompers, 1908b). Thus, in 
order for Loewe to win his case he had to first prove to the court 
that the AFL was a trust, and hence subject to the terms of the 
Sherman Act. 
 
The  stakes in this case, known  as  Loewe  v. Lawler  or  the 
Danbury Hatters’ Case, were high for the AFL. If Loewe, with the 
backing of the AABA, could convince the court that the AFL was a 
trust and subject to the Sherman Act, it would mean more than the 
prohibition of its boycott tactic; it would ultimately rule the AFL an 
illegal organization. In effect, it would mean that under the court of 
law the AFL was a combination no different than for-profit business 
monopolies like Standard Oil. Further- more, a winning decision 
for Loewe could financially damage the AFL because under 
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, Loewe was entitled to collect three 
times the amount of profits he lost due to the boycott as well as the 
cost of his attorney fees (Gompers, 1908b: 181; Laidler, 1913: 153–
4). 
 
Due to a number of delays, Loewe v. Lawlor was not heard 
before the Supreme Court of the United States until 13 October 
1909. Between the years of 1903 and 1909, Loewe claimed that 
he had lost approximately $74,000 in profits from the continued AFL 
boycott. This meant that including his attorney fees he was entitled 
to collect $232,240 when the Supreme Court ruled in his favor. 
The decision by the Supreme Court in this case was unanimous – 
the AFL constituted a trust and its boycott against Loewe was illegal 
under the Sherman Act. According to this ruling, the AFL was not  
only prohibited  from boycotting products, but  also from striking, 
signing union contracts and, ultimately, from existing at all (Sklar, 
1998: 223–4). Perhaps the most significant implication of this court 
decision was that labor was now understood as a commodity by the 
state. 
 
The AFL would have to wait until the Clayton Act was passed in 
1914 to gain exemption from the Sherman Act. From the AFL’s 
perspective  the Clayton Act was hailed to be its ‘magna charta’, as it 
asserted that labor was, in fact, not a commodity (see Gompers, 
1925: 284–99; Robertson, 2000: 191–4). Daniel Davenport, the 
General Counsel of the AABA, stated that the Clayton Act ‘makes 
  
few changes in the existing laws relating to labor unions . . . and 
those are of slight practical importance’ (Wolman, 1916: 9). The 
AABA assisted in shaping the language of the Clayton Act, and 
even though the AFL claimed it to be a great victory for organized 
labor, it still did not overturn Loewe v. Lawlor. The AFL was still 
prohibited from organizing nationwide boycotts. 
 
NAM also challenged the AFL over the legality of its boycott 
practices, including the publication of its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. 
NAM made no secret about its hostility toward organized labor, and 
in 1907 began a 3-year fundraising campaign to raise $500,000 
annually in its fight against unions. Weary of the financial power of 
NAM, the AFL referred to this money as a ‘war fund’ (Gompers, 
1907b: 785). One of the most trenchant battles in the ‘war’ between 
NAM and the AFL arose when James Van Cleave, owner of the 
Buck Stove and Range Company and the President of NAM, 
refused to  recognize union  workers’  demand for a shorter 
workday. The  AFL responded by issuing a boycott against Van 
Cleave’s products and placing the Buck Stove and Range Company 
on its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list.Van Cleave, with the organizational and 
financial backing of NAM, filed an injunction against the AFL for 
these actions. Justice Ashley Gould of the Supreme Court in the 
District of Columbia, granted the injunction on 18 December 
1907. This injunction made it illegal for the AFL to declare ‘or 
threaten any boycott against the compliant’ or ‘distribute through the 
mail, or in any other manner any copies . . . which . . . refer to the 
name of the compliant, its business, or its product in the “We Don’t 
Patronize”, or the “Unfair” list of the defendants’ (Gould, 1908: 114). 
Refusal to abide by this injunction would be punishable by fines 
and prison time. 
 
    Gould’s  issuance of this injunction set off a series of tirades by 
the AFL against the judiciary system, NAM, and Van Cleave. According 
to the AFL, this injunction was  by far  the  most damaging attack 
that it had encountered  because it infringed upon  two 
‘fundamental liberties’: the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
the press (Gompers, 1908a: 98). Not  only was  the AFL silenced 
from ‘declaring’ boycotts, it  was  also without voice in the form of 
printing a boycott through its ‘We  Don’t Patronize’ list. Van Cleave 
claimed that the AFL was coercing its members to withdraw their 
patronage from his products, which the AFL denied. According to 
Gompers: 
 
the members of organized labor are themselves not obliged 
  
to refrain from dealing with the firms on the ‘We Don’t 
Patronize’ list . . . the information is given them. There is 
no compulsion. They are entirely free to use their own 
judgement. (1908a: 102) 
 
The AFL further denied that it had unfairly interfered with Van 
Cleave’s business,  as Justice  Gould assumed. The AFL informed its 
members  that Van Cleave was hostile to organized labor by 
refusing to recognize union hours  and wages – a fact that Van 
Cleave was proud to admit. Gompers wondered why, then, Van 
Cleave was so opposed to his company appearing on the AFL’s 
‘We Don’t Patronize’ list – 
 
if Mr. Van Cleave’s opposition to the union shop is a 
matter of honest and conscientious conviction we should 
think he would writhe in pain under an injunction which 
prevents the publication of the fact. (Gompers, 1908a: 
101) 
 
Indeed, if firms opposed to organized labor truly believed that the 
consuming public was behind their position, they should take pride 
when the AFL acknowledged them  on  its ‘We  Don’t Patronize’ 
list – it was  the ‘best possible advertisement’(Gompers,  1908a: 
100). 
 
The  AFL argued that what was  truly coercive was  the  
injunction granted to Van Cleave, not its own boycott tactic. 
Individuals should be free to exercise the right to buy or not to buy, 
avowed Gompers and ‘no manufacturer, no retailer, has any vested 
right in the purchasing power of an individual or of the community, 
no court can confer upon him that right’ (Gompers, 1908a: 103). 
Before Van Cleave was granted his injunction, the AFL printed the 
following: 
 
Until a law is passed making it compulsory upon labor 
men to buy Van Cleave’s stoves we need not buy them, 
we won’t buy them, and we will persuade other fair-
minded, sympathetic friends to co-operate with us and 
leave the blamed things alone. ‘Go to – with your 
injunctions.’ (American Federationist, 1907b: 792) 
 
Furthermore, the AFL argued that Van Cleave, and other 
manufacturers who claimed that union boycotts restricted free 
trade should be mindful of their hypocrisy of using state 
injunctions to protect their products – a  practice that  indeed  
interfered with  interstate commerce. In  other words, it was 
  
business that infringed upon the rights of  purchasers, not the 
union. 
 
The Buck Stove and Range Case injunction coincided with the 
ruling in the Hatters’ case on 3 February 1908, at which time the 
AFL decided to discontinue its ‘We Don’t Patronize’ list. Gompers 
regretfully informed all affiliated unions that since the AFL was now 
subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, thus liable for monetary 
fines and imprisonment, continuing the list was simply too perilous. 
He cautioned against individual trade unions publishing any boycott 
announcements, as ‘personal  willingness  to bear penalty would avail 
to nothing in this instance to spare the other men of labor and our 
organization from the penalties decreed to them by the Supreme 
Court’ (American Federationist, 1908: 195). While Gompers stated 
that the AFL had to obey the court’s decision, he admitted that he felt 
‘most deeply that never in the history of our country has there 
been so serious an invasion of the rights and liberties of our people’ 
(American Federationist, 1908: 195). 
 
Considering the numerous injunctions that the AFL had faced 
in the past regarding the right to strike, it is important to note that it 
was actually the right to purchase or consume that came to 
define one of the most contentious relationships between 
organized labor, business, and the state at this point in history. 
Although the AFL was forced to relinquish the publication of its ‘We 
Don’t Patronize’ list, this action did not impede the AFL’s effort to 
mobilize consumers  with its union label tactic. Unlike the ‘We 
Don’t Patronize’ list, the union label was not considered a boycott 
by the state because it recommended, rather than prohibited, 
products for consumers to purchase. Thus, the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act did not apply to the  union  label because it did not  interfere 
with  interstate trade in  a negative manner. 
 
After the  Supreme Court’s  decision in  Loewe  v. Lawlor  and 
Justice Gould’s injunction in the Buck Stove and Range case, the 
AFL decided to strengthen its efforts to promote the union label as 
a mobilizing tactic. In response to the outcome of the Loewe case, 
James Lynch, President of the International Typographical Union, 
asked:  
Does not this decision bring clearly to the front the value 
of the union label? Should it not impress on the organized 
workingmen of the country that through the label they 
have a weapon for use against their enemies and 
oppressors that can not be touched by lawyers or courts? 
  
. . . I do advise that redoubled effort should be put forth 
for the patronage of union-labeled products. (Lynch, 
1908: 166) 
 
Thus, rather than relinquish its efforts to mobilize consumers at the 
point of purchase after the loss of its ‘We  Don’t Patronize’ list, the 
Executive Council decided to establish a Union Label Department 
in 1908 to more effectively mobilize the purchasing power of its 
constituency through the union label. By 1908, 68 of the 117 
national trade unions affiliated with the AFL were using a union  
label, about 47 percent of  the aggregate membership of the 




     The AFL continued its union label campaign into the 1920s, 
but by the 1930s it was no longer an important component of its 
strategy of business unionism. As Glickman (1997: 128) rightly 
points out, by the 1930s there was a general cultural shift away 
from ‘consumerism as activism’  toward ‘consumerism as  public  
policy’. The  beginnings of  the ‘second-wave consumer 
movement’ (Cohen, 2003), coordinated by business and the 
federal government to enact consumer safety and protection 
policies, was already underway during the later years of the 
Progressive era. The work of the NCL provides a telling example 
of this transition from the first to the second wave of 
consumerism. The central activity of city and state consumers’ 
leagues, organized into the NCL in 1899, was the construction of 
white lists and labels. However, the importance of these consumer 
tactics began to fade when the NCL began work to help get the 
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 passed and secure a labor law 
to limit the hours  for female workers in the case of Muller v. Oregon 
in 1908 (Dirks, 1996; Storrs, 2000). The commitment of the NCL 
to public policy over its consumer tactics is best captured in its 
decision to end its white label campaign in 1918. According to 
NCL documents, it was becoming increasingly difficult to ensure 
that manufacturers who were awarded the label were meeting its 
labor standards. When the AFL initiated a strike against a Boston 
manufacturer who was awarded the NCL label, it became evident 
to the NCL that consumer tactics would be best left in the hands 
of organized labor and that labor laws, not individual consumers, 
could best regulate working conditions (NCL, 1918a, 1918b). The 
economic power of the consumer at 
  
the point of purchase gradually gave way to the political power of 
the consumer as a citizen. 
 
The AFL did adhere to its ideology of the economic power of 
the consumer longer than Progressive reform organizations like the 
NCL. One may surmise that this was partly a reflection of the 
AFL’s distrust of the state and its reluctance during the  time to  
engage in  political action. However, it was also a reflection of the 
failure of the state to fully recognize the significance of 
consumption in terms other than consumer protection and safety. As 
Glickman (1997: 155) and Cohen (2003: 20) emphasize, this 
changed during the New Deal, when the state began to view 
consumption as  a means to bring the nation out of  the Great 
Depression. The purchasing power of the consumer became a 
central component of public policy during the 1930s, co-opting 
much of the activism that informed the working-class consumer 
consciousness of the Progressive era. However, as recent studies 
(Cohen, 2003; Frank, 1999; Friedman, 1999; Glickman, 2001, 2004) 
demonstrate, consumer activism in the USA did not entirely dis- 
appear after the New Deal. From the bus boycotts during the Civil 
Rights era to  current  environmental boycotts against eating 
Chilean sea bass, consumers  have continued to exercise their 
economic power to try to change society. 
 
Notes 
1. It is important to note that ‘American consumer activism’ existed prior 
to the 
Progressive era (see Breen, 2004; Frank, 1999; Glickman, 2004). 
2. Brooks became the President of the NCL when it was established in 
1899. The League created its own label, which was placed on white 
goods produced under fair working conditions. For more on the League 
see Sklar (1998). The constructive nature of the union label was not 
shared by all; see Nichols (1897). 
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